The Invisible Hand of History — War and Peace

Napoleon began the war with Russia because he could not resist Dresden, homage, a Polish uniform, a June morning, and bursts of anger before Kurakin and Balashev. Alexander refused negotiations because he felt personally insulted. Barclay de Tolly tried to command well because he wished to fulfill his duty and earn fame. Rostov charged because he could not restrain a wish for a gallop across a level field. Innumerable others acted from fear, vanity, habit, and aims, imagining they knew what they were doing of their own free will. They were involuntary tools of history. The higher they stand, the less they are free. Providence compelled men striving for personal aims to a result none expected, neither Napoleon, nor Alexander, nor those who did the fighting.

The destruction of the French army of 1812 is now clear: an advance into the heart of Russia late in the season without winter preparation, and a war given its character by burning towns and the hatred that aroused. No one then foresaw that this was the only way an army of eight hundred thousand, the best in the world, could be destroyed by a raw army of half the strength with inexperienced commanders. Russians tried to hinder the only thing that could save them. French efforts, despite so-called genius, pushed on to Moscow at summer's end, the very thing bound to lead to destruction. French writers later say Napoleon felt the danger of extending his line and that marshals advised a stop at Smolensk. Russian writers invent a Scythian plan to lure him deep, attributed now to Pfuel, now to Toll, now to Alexander. Those hints survive only because they fit the event. Facts contradict them. Russia did everything to stop the French. Napoleon welcomed every step forward and sought battle less eagerly than in former campaigns.

The armies were divided. The sole aim was to unite them, which is no advantage if the intent is to retire and lure. The Emperor joined to defend every inch, not to retreat. The Drissa camp was formed on Pfuel's plan. He reproached every retirement and could not bear the enemy reaching Smolensk, still less Moscow burned. Bagration delayed junction so as not to come under the detested foreigner Barclay, whose rank was inferior to his own. The Emperor's presence and swarm of advisers destroyed the first army's energy. Paulucci wrecked Pfuel's plan. Barclay's power was limited. From confusion came indecision and growing patriotic zeal. The Emperor left to inspire the capitals, and the army's strength was trebled, yet Bennigsen, the Tsarevich, and adjutants remained as eyes, and Barclay grew still more cautious. Polish adjutants were packed off to Petersburg. At Smolensk the armies reunited. Bagration submitted and agreed less than ever, writing to Arakcheev that headquarters are so full of Germans a Russian cannot exist. A general sent to survey a position spent the day with a friend and condemned a battleground he had not seen. The French stumbled on Neverovski's division. An unexpected battle saved the communications. Smolensk was abandoned contrary to the Emperor and the people, burned by inhabitants misled by their governor, who went to Moscow thinking of their losses and kindling hatred. Napoleon advanced farther. The result that caused his destruction was reached by accident, intrigue, and aims that had no perception of the one way of saving Russia.