Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there can be no doubt of the victory, for the battlefield remains in French hands. The Russians retreat and abandon their ancient capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions, and incalculable wealth, is his. The Russian army, only half the French strength, makes no attempt to attack for a whole month. He can fall on that army with double its numbers, negotiate an advantageous peace, threaten Petersburg, or, in case of reverse, return to Smolensk or Vilna, or simply remain. No special genius would seem required to keep that position. The simple steps were not to allow looting, to prepare winter clothing of which Moscow had enough for the whole army, and to collect provisions which French historians say would have lasted six months. Napoleon, that greatest of geniuses who historians declare controlled the army, took none of those steps.
He used his power to select the most foolish and ruinous of all the courses open to him. He remained till October, letting the troops plunder; then, hesitating whether to leave a garrison, he quit Moscow, approached Kutuzov without joining battle, turned to the right, reached Malo-Yaroslavets without breaking through to the road Kutuzov later took, and retired to Mozhaysk along the devastated Smolensk road. Had his aim been to destroy his army, the most skilful strategist could hardly have devised a series of actions that would so completely have accomplished that purpose, independently of anything the Russians might do. To say he destroyed the army because he wished to, or because he was stupid, would be as unjust as to say he brought the troops to Moscow because he was a genius. In both cases his personal activity had no more force than that of any soldier. It merely coincided with the laws that guided the event.
Historians quite falsely represent his faculties as having weakened in Moscow, and do so only because the results did not justify his actions. He employed all his ability for himself and his army, as he had done previously and as he did in 1813. His activity was no less astounding than in Egypt, Italy, Austria, or Prussia. Russians, Tolstoy says, have paid for the right to look at the matter plainly and will not abandon that right. Order after order and plan after plan issued from the time he entered until he left. The absence of citizens and of a deputation, even the burning of the city, did not disconcert him. He did not lose sight of the army's welfare, the enemy, the people of Russia, affairs in Paris, or the diplomatic terms of the anticipated peace.
