When Good Intentions Aren't Enough — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith examines the tradition, ancient and Christian, that makes benevolence the whole of virtue. In the later Platonists and their modern heirs, love is the governing attribute of the Deity; human perfection consists in resembling it. Dr. Hutcheson, the most judicious of these authors, argues that proper benevolence is doubly recommended by sympathy, that even its weaknesses are engaging, and that discovered self-interest diminishes merit like base alloy in gold.

Casuists, Hutcheson notes, appeal to public good as the standard of rectitude; benevolence directed to the happiness of all intelligent beings is therefore the supreme virtue. Self-love is never virtuous, and regard even to self-approbation taints beneficence. Smith concedes the system's power to nourish the noblest affections, yet finds it defective. It cannot explain approbation of prudence, economy, industry, and self-preservation, which are laudable though cultivated from interest. Mixed motives often show weakness in benevolence, not impurity in care of oneself.

Benevolence may be God's sole principle of action; man, needing many external things, must often act from other springs. The three great accounts of virtue are propriety, prudence, and benevolence; obedience to the Deity and utility-based systems reduce, Smith argues, to one of these. Moral philosophy must leave room for duties that imperfect creatures owe to themselves as well as to others.