Forty nations notice Rome too late and combine to crush her. The usual Roman answer in peril is a dictator: power to one man to decide without advice and carry out his resolves without appeal. Machiavelli's first lesson is not yet the office. It is the clock. A mischief already grown, inside or outside, that fills the community with alarm is safer to temporize with than to quell by violence. Those who strike only add fuel and hasten the ruin. Such disorders more often come from inside: a citizen suffered to acquire undue influence, or a once-living institution allowed to rot until the attempt to check it is more dangerous than to let it be. Beginnings are hard to see because men look with favour on what seems great, especially in the young. Cosimo de' Medici, from prudence and from the blindness of others, is held in such awe that to offend him is dangerous and to let him alone is more dangerous. Nicolo da Uzzano, having missed the first rise, will not permit a second mistake of crushing him, judging that the attempt would ruin the state. After Uzzano's death, some disregard that counsel, banish Cosimo, and so make his partisans recall him as prince of the republic, a dignity he would not have reached without the open opposition. The same happens with Caesar: Pompey's fear comes late, the remedies accelerate the destruction of the republic. When the disease is finally known, temporizing lets it die or defers the injury. The prince who would suppress it must study the symptoms: if equal to the cure, grapple fearlessly; if not, let it be. Otherwise it fares with him as with Rome's neighbours, for whom it would have been safer to soothe a grown city by peaceful arts than to provoke her by open war. The league makes the Romans more united, and among the new expedients is the dictator.
Some writers blame that office as the seed of tyranny, because Caesar later wore the name. Machiavelli splits the cases. It was not the name or office of dictator that brought Rome to servitude, but the influence certain citizens assumed from prolonged power. Power may readily give titles; titles do not give power. While the dictatorship was conferred by public ordinances and not through personal influence, it was constantly beneficial. A dictator was not created for life, but for a fixed term, and only for the emergency. He could determine measures, act without consultation, and punish without appeal. He could not deprive senate or people of their privileges, subvert ancient institutions, or introduce new ones. Brief time, limited authority, and an uncorrupted people made it impossible for him to overstep so as to injure the city. Ordinary institutions work slowly; no council acts in everything alone; time is required to reconcile differences; the remedies they provide are most dangerous when the case will not brook delay. Every republic ought to have some such resource in its constitution, as Venice reserves authority to a few citizens agreed among themselves. Without it, a city is ruined by observing forms, or must break them to save itself, and irregular methods, even when useful, teach a practice of violating the laws for good ends under colour of which they may later be violated for ends which are not good. Those wounds a man inflicts on himself pain him less than those inflicted by another, so the consuls keep the power to appoint the dictator. Republics that cannot in sudden emergencies resort to a dictator or some similar authority will, when the danger is serious, always be undone.
The Ten look like a contradiction: they are chosen by free and open suffrage to make laws, then become tyrants. The difference is the missing watch and the term. Unrestricted authority conferred for a year or more is always dangerous. When a dictator was appointed, tribunes, consuls, and senate still stood, and he could not abolish the senatorial rank or pass new laws. On the creation of the Ten, consuls and tribunes are swept away, and express powers are given to do whatever they think fit, with the entire authority of the whole Roman people. Alone, with no appeal, with none to keep a watch, and stimulated by Appius, in the second year they wax insolent. A public vote is not hurtful only when the people confer authority with due limitations and for a reasonable term. Spartan kings and Venetian doges were controlled by checks. Uncontrolled authority will, in the briefest time, make even an uncorrupted people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends. Poverty in the man who holds it is no hindrance. Wealth follows the office.
Then a civic habit that looks like a military note. Under the consuls Marcus Fabius and Gnaeus Manlius, Quintus Fabius, consul the year before, is slain fighting the Veientines, still serving in a lower place. Rome does not think high office a costume you refuse to take off. Venice still lets a citizen who has filled a great office be ashamed to accept a less, and the state permits him to decline it. That course, if it lends lustre to individuals, is to the disadvantage of the community. The city should hope more from the citizen who descends than from the one who has only stepped up, unless experienced company surrounds the new man. Had Rome forbidden former consuls to go with the army except as consul, inexperience plus ambition with no one nearby to fear would have made men less scrupulous, and the public service would have paid. A law that reaches backward to punish an old abuse has not yet been named.