Ingratitude has two springs: avarice and suspicion. A prince or a people sends a captain on an important enterprise. He earns a great name. They then owe him a reward. If they begrudge the gift, that is avarice, and Tacitus is cited: men are readier to pay back injuries than benefits, since to requite a benefit is felt as a burden. If they fear the name he now carries, that is suspicion, and it has more excuse. The victorious captain covers himself with glory, enriches his soldiers, and acquires credit with followers, enemy, and subjects that cannot be wholly agreeable to the master who stayed home. Ambition and jealousy inflame the first arrogant word. The prince can think only of how to secure himself: put the captain to death, or show that the victory was fortune, cowardice of the enemy, or someone else's skill. After Vespasian is proclaimed in Judaea, Antonius Primus defeats Vitellius, occupies Rome, and does Mutianus's work for him. Mutianus strips the command. Vespasian receives Antonius so coldly that in despair he puts himself to death. Gonsalvo of Cordova subdues Naples for Ferdinand of Aragon; Ferdinand comes, takes the army, takes the fortresses, and carries him back to Spain, where he dies in disgrace. Peoples have two ends, to acquire liberty and to preserve it, and in preserving they injure those who ought to be rewarded and suspect those who should be trusted. In a corrupt city those errors lead toward tyranny, as when Caesar takes by force what ingratitude denied him. In an uncorrupted republic they can prolong free institutions by making men less ambitious through fear. Rome is the least ungrateful of great peoples. Coriolanus and Camillus are banished for wrongs to the commons; Camillus is recalled and honoured. The one grave case is Scipio: the greatness of the enemy, the fame, the suddenness, the youth, until even the magistrates stand in awe, and Cato declares that no city is free which contains a citizen feared by its magistrates. Commonwealths are rarely led by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion, because they have far less reason to suspect.
The prince who would not be tormented by that suspicion should go himself on his wars, as the first Roman emperors did and as the Turk does now. When he conquers, the glory is his. When he is absent, he will seem to profit nothing unless that glory be quenched, and the loss from becoming ungrateful is then greater than the gain. The captain he sends cannot escape ingratitude. Two courses only: quit after victory, place himself in the prince's hands, and abstain from every vainglorious act; or take boldly the contrary course, corrupt officers, hold fortresses, and punish the master for the ingratitude he looks for. Men who cannot be wholly good or wholly bad remain undecided and are crushed while they waver. A commonwealth cannot go itself. It must send a citizen. Rome's remedy is that nobles and commons alike take part, so many valiant soldiers are always found that the nation has never ground to be jealous of one man, and he obtained most glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down.
Rome is also gentler with captains than other republics. Purposed error is chastised with gentleness. Error from ignorance is not punished, and is sometimes honoured, because a commander sent against Philip or Hannibal is already weighted with enough care, and the example of crucified generals would make vigour impossible. The ignominy of defeat is judged punishment enough. Sergius and Virginius, before Veii, each prefer the other's humiliation to the city's honour: one will not ask aid, the other will not go unasked. Another republic would have put them to death. Rome inflicts a money fine, unwilling to depart from ancient practice. Varro, by rashness, loses at Cannae and almost loses Roman liberty. Because he acted through ignorance and with no evil design, the whole senate goes forth to meet him, and as they cannot thank him for having fought, they thank him for having come back and for not having despaired of the country. When Papirius Cursor would have Fabius put to death for fighting the Samnites against orders, Fabius's father reminds him that never on the defeat of any captain had the Romans done what Papirius desired on the occasion of a victory.
Benefits, though, must not wait for panic. When Porsenna comes to restore the Tarquins, the senate fears the commons will take the kings back rather than fight. It relieves the duty on salt and the other burdens at once, saying the poor do enough for the common welfare in rearing their offspring. The commons then undergo war, siege, and famine. No one should rely on that example to delay conciliation until danger has actually come. The mass will thank the enemy, not him, and will fear that when the danger has passed he will take back what he gave under compulsion. The Roman grant works because the state is still new, because a law of appeal to the tribunes already exists, and because the memory of the kings is still fresh. Like conditions seldom recur. A prince or a republic ought to live with its people in prosperity as it would think right in calamity. Whoever believes he can win men by benefits after the ram is at the gate deceives himself. He will not keep his place. He may hurry his fall. A grown mischief, and whether to smash it or wait, has not yet been argued.