Every useful trial grows a harm beside it, a captain earns trust by deeds not titles, knowledge of one landscape teaches the next, and fraud in war is fair only against someone who never trusted you. Unless fortune helps you past that pair, you never arrive at excellence. Livy says the combat of Titus Manlius and the Gaul determined the issue of the entire war: the Gauls abandon camp, withdraw toward Tivoli, then pass into Campania. A small fight can ruin a side. A prudent captain therefore should not stake the whole fortune on an operation of trifling moment. The opposite counsel is also true. When the adversary is new and redoubtable, skirmishes teach the men his quality and shake off the dread his name inspires. Valerius Corvinus, sent against the Samnites for the first time, makes his men try them in unimportant passages of arms, lest they be dismayed by a new foe and a new method. The evil sits so near the good that you may grasp the one when you think to take the other. A first defeat in those trials dispirits where you meant to reassure. As a rule, then, skirmishes are to be avoided, and allowed only where you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. Passes into the country are not to be defended unless the whole army can cooperate. Towns are not to be held unless their loss necessarily involves ruin, and those you do hold must be arranged so that, in a siege, your whole force can be used. What you voluntarily abandon does not forfeit military reputation. What you meant to hold, and all know you meant to hold, ruins you like the Gauls after their champion falls. Philip of Macedon, invaded by Rome, lays waste and relinquishes what he cannot defend, judging it more hurtful to lose after an attempt than to abandon as something he cared little to retain. After Cannae, Rome refuses aid to many subject states and charges them to defend themselves. You lose only a friend. In failing a defence, you lose the friend and weaken yourself. Marius, sent against the Cimbrians already famous for routing a Roman army, posts his men where they must pass, inside an entrenched camp, until a fierce people look like a disorderly rabble encumbered with baggage. The army grows eager. That is the safer trial.
Valerius, still not thinking skirmishes enough, then addresses his men in the words Livy gives him: follow my deeds and not my words; with this right hand I have won three consulships. Titles do not give lustre to men. Men give lustre to titles. Advancement by chance or intrigue takes reputation away. If a veteran army still needs unusual methods against an unfamiliar foe, a raw army needs them more, because any army will inspire terror in untrained men. Gracchus and Epaminondas train untried troops for months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them to discipline and obedience, then employ them with confidence against practised veterans. No man of warlike genius need despair of creating a good army if only he have the men. A prince who has many subjects and still lacks soldiers has only his own inertness and want of foresight to thank, and must not complain of the cowardice of his people.
A captain then needs knowledge of places, general and particular, and the chase teaches it faster than any other exercise. Xenophon's Cyrus likens an expedition against Armenia to a hunt: men on the hilltops spread the toils; beaters start the game on the plain. The chase is a mimic of war, and the heroes who ruled the world were bred in the woods. He who lacks practical acquaintance with some one country can only with difficulty, and after a long time, obtain a knowledge of another. He who possesses it takes in the next at a glance. All countries resemble one another enough that a person who knows one district well can see how this plain spreads, how that mountain slopes, whither that valley winds. Publius Decius, military tribune under Cornelius against the Samnites, sees a steep hill the enemy have been blind enough to neglect, seizes it with three thousand men, and saves the army from a defile. At night he puts on a common soldier's cloak, lest the enemy observe an officer making his rounds, and learns where the guards are posted and by what exit they may issue. Occupying the hill saved the army. Finding the exit saved the men he had taken there. Without that knowledge of the ground he could not have judged the hill accessible, occupied it, or distinguished the path home from those guarded by the foe.
Fraud in war is then called praiseworthy, provided it is not the breaking of a plighted word. Territory won by a broken covenant can never gain glory. Hannibal feigns flight at Thrasymene and later fastens lights to the horns of oxen. Pontius dresses soldiers as herdsmen, has them say the Samnite army has gone to besiege Nocera, and draws the consuls into the Caudine Forks. The victory would have been most glorious had he taken his father Herennius's advice: set the Romans at liberty unconditionally, or put them all to death. A mean course which neither gains friends nor gets rid of foes is, in affairs of moment, always hurtful. The army is in the forks. What to do with it is still open.