Opposite methods can win if valour cloaks them, but in a republic public severity is safer than private love, taking a share back makes you hated, and a command that never ends finishes the road to servitude. Hannibal enters Italy by violence, rapine, cruelty, and treachery, and the states revolt to him. Scipio enters Spain by humane and generous conduct, and the province loves him. Men so love change that those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are badly off, and they open the door to whoever heads a new movement. Love and fear both command. It matters little which a captain chooses if he has transcendent valour and a great name. Each excess still injures. He who would be greatly loved, if he swerves a little, becomes contemptible. He who would be greatly feared, if he goes a jot too far, incurs hatred. Scipio's soldiers, standing in no fear of him, rise with certain allies, and he is forced to a cruelty foreign to his nature. Hannibal's inhumanity keeps a mixed army without mutiny, and also makes Rome hunt him to death when Pyrrhus they would not poison. Naples and other towns stay loyal from dread of his character. Valour cloaks the error. It does not cancel the bill.
Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus then win the same glory by honourable methods that are still opposite. Manlius never spares fatigue or remits punishment, and puts his own son to death. Valerius never deals harshly, and is easy and familiar. Neither army flinches or mutinies. Manlius is obliged to be severe because his nature prompts commands that are hard to execute, and hard commands cannot be enforced by gentleness. If you would be obeyed you must know how to command: measure your power to enforce against their willingness to yield, and otherwise abstain. Those hard commands restore a republic's ordinances. A republic often enough under men who reinforce its laws might endure forever. Valerius can be humane because it is enough that the army do what is already customary, and punishment, if it comes, is imputed to the laws, not to him. Writers who lay down rules for princes hold by Valerius and by Xenophon's Cyrus. Livy praises both: Valerius shares hardship and even the military games; Manlius's severity against his son brings the army to the pitch that beats the Latins, and whichever side had Manlius must have won. For a citizen under a republic, Machiavelli holds by Manlius. Harshness shown to all alike, and only for the common welfare, gains no partisans. Valerius's personal goodwill, in a prolonged command, can be fatal to public liberty. It did not happen to Valerius because Roman minds were not yet corrupted, and because they had never remained long and continuously under him. Venice once sees last year's captain still the sailors, and the senate, jealous, gets rid of him. The methods of Valerius are useful in a prince, pernicious in a private citizen: they pave a way to tyranny, and they force fellow-citizens to protect themselves to his hurt. The methods of Manlius, hurtful in a prince, are useful in a citizen and in the highest degree for his country.
Camillus, closer to Manlius than to Valerius, is both hated and admired. Soldiers admire his care, prudence, magnanimity, and order. They hate that he is more stern to punish than bountiful to reward. He puts Veientine sale-money to public uses, rides four white horses as if equal to the sun god, and recovers from his men a tenth already vowed to Apollo. A people never forgets being deprived of an advantage, because every small occasion recalls it. Pride, even when it does no hurt, is detested, most of all by a free people. To invite hatred without resulting advantage is rash and futile.
Prolonged commands then finish what personal love began. Rome's two roads to breakup are the agrarian laws and the extension of office. Lucius Quintius refuses a longer consulship and tells the senate to discredit evil examples, not add to them. Publius Philo, at the siege of Palaeopolis, is the first proconsul. The further the arms go, the more such extensions seem needed. Fewer men are trained to command. Soldiers in time hold the senate of no account and look only to the captain. That is how Sylla and Marius find adherents even to the public detriment, and how Caesar overthrows the liberties of his country. Had Rome never prolonged civil or military authority, she might have been slower to build an empire. She would certainly have been later in incurring servitude.