A path to honours that does not need a purse, a private feud left to ripen, a forced peace that cannot hold, and a private store that buys a following, are four ways a city trains a second government. No ordinance helps a commonwealth so much as one that enforces poverty on its citizens. Rome has no single law you can point to, and the agrarian law is stubbornly resisted, yet four hundred years after the founding, great poverty still prevails. The path to honours is closed to none, and merit is sought wherever it is found, so riches are the less courted. Cincinnatus is ploughing little more than four acres when messengers name him dictator to deliver Minutius from the Equians. He puts on his gown, raises an army, wins, and will not let the rescued men share the plunder of those to whom they had so nearly fallen a prey. He reduces Minutius to a subaltern until he learns how to command, and makes Lucius Tarquinius, poor enough to serve on foot, his master of the knights. Regulus, in Africa, asks leave to tend a farm his labourers have let run to waste. Paulus Emilius, almost in the last happy days, still finds that a silver cup given to his son-in-law is the first silver vessel in that house. These men, at the head of armies, surpass princes in loftiness of spirit, and at home become humble, frugal, and submissive to magistrates again.
A feud at Ardea then shows how a private quarrel becomes a summons to foreign arms. An heiress is claimed by a plebeian and a noble. Guardian and mother split. The whole town takes sides, the weaker faction calls the Volscians, the nobles call Rome, and the ringleaders die when Rome has starved the Volscians out. Lucretia and Virginia are named as the same kind of occasion: a wrong done to a woman drives the Tarquins from their kingdom and breaks the power of the decemvirs. Aristotle puts such injuries among the chief causes of a tyrant's fall. Rulers who let a rivalry come to a head must later reunite with outside help, which is the shortest road to servitude.
Three ways then offer themselves to compose a divided city: put the ringleaders to death, as the consuls did at Ardea; banish them; or bind the citizens to live at peace and take security for it. The last is the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the least effectual, because men who have shed blood cannot be forced to live at peace while they still meet every day: fresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting. Pistoja is the modern proof. Fifteen years of Panciatichi and Cancellieri, first in arms, then only with the arms laid aside. Florence tries a forced peace, gets more tumult, pulling down of houses and plunder, then imprisons and banishes the heads of both factions, and calls that a settlement. Death would have been surest. Weak republics cannot use the first method and barely use the second, because ancient courses look inhuman, the result of an enfeebling education and ignorance of affairs. The sages of Florence pronounce that Pistoja is to be held by feuds and Pisa by fortresses, not perceiving how useless each method is in itself. Holding a subject city by its feuds is as useless as holding Pisa by fortresses. You cannot be friends with both factions, because wherever there is division it is human nature to take a side. In war you will have enemies inside and out, and you will lose the city as soon as you are involved in war. Two evils follow a republic that must control a divided town: there can be no good government where you change its form to fit now one humour and now another, and the factious spirit infects your own republic. Biondo says that in seeking to unite Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out. In 1501, when Arezzo is lost and the Vitelli and Duke Valentino occupy the valleys, a French envoy finds men in the lost towns claiming to be of the party of the Marzocco, and blames the distinction. In France a subject who said he was of the king's party would be punished, because the expression would imply a party hostile to the king. A king wants subjects, not a party. Weak rulers, seeing they cannot hold by their own strength, take to these devices, which in tranquil times may help a little and in danger are shown to be worthless.
A republic must then watch what its citizens are about, because the seeds of a tyranny often lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds. In a famine Spurius Melius privately lays in corn and feeds the people at his own expense. The senate, fearing the bounty, appoints a dictator and puts him to death. Credit won by advising well, or acting still better, for the common advantage should have a wide door and open rewards. Credit won by lending money, helping marriages, and defending men against the magistrates buys devoted adherents and then corrupts the laws. Rome gives triumphs for the first kind, accusations for the second, and a dictator when the people are blinded by a false show of benevolence. If conduct like Melius's is suffered to pass unchastised, men are not easily led back.