A captain who can make an army, a line that will not fly at a word, one head instead of two, and worth kept in use while the times are quiet, are four ways to keep a force you can still command. Livy reads Coriolanus as proof that captains, not soldiers, spread Roman power: the Volscians only succeed once he leads them, and he withdraws for his mother, not because Roman arms force him. Machiavelli will not let that ledger sit. Armies under the Scipios in Spain, both leaders fallen, still save themselves and the province. Caesar in Spain says he goes against an army without a captain; in Thessaly, against a captain without an army. Lucullus, sent ignorant against Mithridates, is taught by a brave army and its officers. Gracchus drills slaves into a serviceable force. Pelopidas and Epaminondas make Theban peasantry beat Sparta. Excellence on one side generally finds excellence on the other. A good army left without a good leader, as Alexander's Macedonians or the civil-war veterans, grows restless. Better to trust the captain who has time to discipline and means to equip, than a tumultuary host with a chance leader of its own choosing. Twofold is the glory of those who must organise the force before they meet the enemy. Many famous captains, asked to do that, would be less thought of than they are.
Strange sights and sounds then show what an undisciplined mass is for. Quintius shouts that the other wing is already victorious, giving confidence to his own and dismay to the Volscians, and wins. The Oddeschi enter Perugia by night, a hammerman at the last chain cannot swing, calls "back" for room, and the word runs until those furthest off begin to run and the attempt dissolves from that trifling circumstance. Discipline is needed not so much to fight in a settled order as not to be thrown by every accident. A tumultuary host flies at every word, cry, or sound. Fix who receives orders, and accustom the rest to look only to those persons. Neglect that precaution and the gravest mishaps constantly ensue. A captain has two things to see to: throw the enemy by some sudden surprise, and be prepared to discover and defeat the same stratagem used against him. Sulpitius mounts sutlers and camp followers on mules behind a hill, spears and banners making them look like horse, and at a signal they appear when the fight is hottest; the Gauls lose the battle. Semiramis's oxhide elephants, sewn and placed upon camels and sent to the front, are found out by the King of India and hurt her. Fidenae's fire-lances scare, then shame, the Romans once Mamercus asks if they will fly like bees from smoke, and tells them to efface Fidenae with her own flames. A feint should be formidable as well as seeming so, for when it menaces a real danger its weak points are not so soon discerned. If it has more pretence than reality, keep it in the background like the muleteers, or do not use it. Weakness brought near is soon seen, and then the trick does harm rather than good.
One head, not many. Three tribunes sent against Fidenae fall out and come home with discredit, saved only by their soldiers. The senate appoints a dictator so one man can mend what three disordered. Livy: each forming a different opinion, and each abiding by his own, they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies. In 1500 Luca d'Antonio Albizzi, jealous of Giovambattista Ridolfi, hides in silence at the siege of Pisa. When Ridolfi is called home, Luca, left in sole charge, shows courage, prudence, and zeal that the joint command had buried. Agrippa yields the Equian war to Quintius because most wholesome it is that in affairs of great moment supreme authority be vested in one man. The French and Italian armies of Machiavelli's day keep appointing several captains to one command, thinking to be better served, and that practice is among the most active causes of their overthrow. Better one of ordinary prudence than two of great parts with a divided command.
Quiet times then do the other theft. Athens, victorious, debates Sicily. Alcibiades wants the war for fame. Nicias, against it, says the strongest reason to trust him is that peace is not for his advantage: in quiet, numberless citizens take precedence of him; in war, none. Slighted men, seeing the cause is tranquillity, may stir wars to change the times. Two remedies: keep citizens poor, so wealth without worth cannot buy the post, and be so prepared for war that worth is always needed. Rome after Carthage and Antiochus commits armies to whom she will. Paulus Emilius is rejected until the Macedonian war is judged formidable. After 1494 Florence has no success until Antonio Giacomini leads. While the wars are dangerous, rivalry is suspended. When Pisa looks easy, three commissaries are chosen and Antonio is left out. Captains who know neither how to blockade nor how to storm it hold the town so long that Florence, which should have reduced Pisa by force, is obliged to buy it. A republic that parks the person it will need has already named how it will pay.