Good or bad fortune depends on whether a man's methods accord with the times. Some act on impulse, some with caution. Few keep the mean. Fabius Maximus is cautious by nature, not by choice, and that nature meets Hannibal young, two defeats in, Rome stripped of her best soldiers. Delay saves the republic. When Scipio would cross to Africa, Fabius fights him, unable to drop the habit. Had he been king of Rome, the war might never have left Italy. A commonwealth produces a Fabius when delay is needed and a Scipio when a close is needed. A prince, stuck in one nature, is ruined when the weather turns. Piero Soderini's patience prospers, then ruins him with his country. Julius II's impulse prospers because the times match; other times would have destroyed him, because he could not have changed. Two reasons block the change: we cannot act against our bent, and success in one method convinces us never to try another. Commonwealths are slower still. One citizen altering his conduct is not enough. The whole community must be stirred.
Because Fabius wore Hannibal out, sluggard princes and effeminate republics tell a captain to avoid battle, as if that were Fabius. It is not. A captain who would keep the field cannot decline when the enemy forces the fight at all hazards. The instruction is only this: you shall engage when it pleases your enemy, not when it suits yourself. To keep the field and still avoid battle you must put fifty miles between you, or shut yourself in a town. Both are ruin: the country is left a prey, or the army is starved. Fabius did not avoid battle. He sought it where Hannibal dared not come. Had Hannibal been minded to fight at all hazards, Fabius would have had to take one of three courses: the fifty miles, the town, or retreat. Philip of Macedon copies the hill and is driven from it, then copies the fifty miles and ruins his subjects, then at last hazards a regular engagement. Delay is useful only when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not come to the trenches, as with Sulpitius against the Gauls. Hannibal in Africa does not play Fabius, because he cannot maintain the army long, and because more glory is won in being beaten by force than by any other cause. Scipio, having beaten Syphax and taken African towns, could have waited. The invader, and still more the man who sits down before a town, cannot. Charles of Burgundy, beleaguering Morat, is attacked and routed. The French at Novara meet the same Swiss lesson.
One who must contend with many, though weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand the first onset and then divide them. Appius Claudius finds among the tribunes one timid, venal, or lover of the general good, who will oppose the rest. Venice in 1484 bribes Lodovico of Milan and recovers by peace more than she lost in war. Spain breaks a world league against France and the rest must treat. Venice in 1508 cannot temporize, has no army that can wait, and is undone, though the Pope and Spain would later have saved Lombardy from France if they could. Give up a part to save the rest before war starts. After it starts, the surrender looks like compulsion, and few in Venice even see the danger.
A prudent captain then does what he can to make it necessary for his own to fight, and to relieve the enemy of that necessity. He leaves open a way he might have closed, and closes a way he might have left open. Cities are harder to recover after revolt because they fear punishment. Florence spends more than Venice because she is ringed with free towns, Venice with towns used to princes. Promise pardon, or say you come only against a few ambitious men. The mass, wanting present quiet, shut their eyes. Florence is taken that way. Crassus sees through Parthian offers and still cannot keep his men. The Samnites, refused peace, are told by Pontius that those arms are sacred in which lie their only hopes. The Veientines shut in the Roman camp fight until a tribune opens a way, then prefer flight. Vectius Mescius names necessity the last and mightiest weapon. Camillus, inside Veii, orders his men to spare the unarmed so the defenders will throw their weapons down.