A split is not an open gate, a taunt is not a weapon, and a victory you overrun becomes a defeat. Violent dissensions break out in Rome between commons and nobles. The Veientines and Etruscans think this is the hour to deal a fatal blow. They invade, camp close, and heap taunts on the Roman name until the divided city reconciles, gives battle, and breaks them. Ease and tranquillity cause division. Fear and war cause union. Had they been wise they would have avoided war the more they saw Rome at feud, and tried peaceful arts instead. The wise course in a divided city is to gain the confidence of both factions and mediate while they do not come to blows; if they do, give tardy aid to the weaker side so both exhaust themselves, without putting forth so much strength that they suspect you mean to be their master. Pistoja is won that way. Florence favours each side in turn until both, wearied, throw themselves into her arms. Siena never changes her government with Florentine support except when that support is slight. Whenever Florence interferes in a marked way, all parties unite to keep things as they stood. Filippo Visconti, relying on Florentine divisions, spends two millions of gold and has nothing to show. Anyone who hopes to prevail against a divided people on those grounds will always find themselves deceived.
Taunts take nothing from an adversary's strength. They make him more cautious and inflame his hatred. They are weapons that wound those who use them. Gabade, the Persian general, is ready to raise the siege of Amida when the inhabitants come out on the walls to upbraid his cowardice. He changes his mind, storms the town, and sacks it. The Veientines molest the Roman palisade more with their tongues than with their swords until soldiers who were unwilling to fight force the consuls to lead them out. Valerius Corvinus, after the Capuan mutiny, makes it a severe punishment to upbraid any soldier with having taken part. Tiberius Gracchus, commanding slaves armed in the war with Hannibal, makes it death to reproach them with their origin. Whether done in sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more. The biting jest that flavours too much of truth leaves a rankling memory.
False hope of victory, bred by insolence, makes men overrun a certain good for something better and uncertain. After Cannae, Hanno tells Carthage to make peace while they can have it as conquerors, and to show they are strong enough to fight Rome without peril to the win they already hold. The senate will not. The wisdom is seen later, when the chance is gone. Tyre, built like Venice in the sea, offers Alexander obedience but will not receive him within the walls. After four months he is ready to grant what they first asked. They kill the envoy. He takes the city, slays or enslaves the inhabitants. In 1512 a Spanish army, failing to find the promised rising in Florence, offers terms. The people in their pride refuse, and so give occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the republic. The Spaniards wanted three things: a change of government, a break with France, and money. Keeping the government and yielding the other two would have been a sufficient victory. A prince attacked by a stronger enemy makes no greater mistake than to refuse to treat when overtures are made. Poor terms still contain some advantage that can be read as a partial success. Hannibal, recalled to a Carthage already confined within her walls, with Numidia lost and Hasdrubal and Syphax beaten, feels no shame to sue for peace before he will play the last stake. When peace is refused he fights, resolved to fall gloriously if he must. If a commander that valiant will sue rather than risk enslaving his country, a lesser captain has still less excuse. Men know not where to set bounds to their hopes, and rush headlong on destruction.