A corrupt room, a half-measure, and a fortress are three ways to keep a city you have already lost. People present at deliberations know how falsely men judge. Unless talks are guided by men of great parts, the conclusions are certain to be wrong. In corrupt republics, and especially in quiet times, able men are pushed aside by jealousy. Bad measures are judged good, or promoted by those who seek public favour rather than public advantage. Adversity later recalls the forgotten. Cases also mislead the inexperienced, because they wear the face of what men already wish to believe. The Latins, after defeat, believe their praetor Numitius that the Roman victory is a victory in name only, raise a new army, and are routed. The same hope visits Pope Leo's advisers when Francis of France comes to recover Milan from the Swiss. They tell the Pope to stand neutral, let French and Swiss weaken each other, then fall on the victor with Church and Spanish troops watching from the Lombard frontier, and so remain master of Italy. The Swiss are routed after a long fight. The Pope's troops prepare for flight. Only the king's humanity or indifference saves them. The plausible distance-view is wrong. A captain who wins loses few in the heat of battle, which is short, and the reputation of victory outweighs the dead. An enemy who then attacks him is taught his mistake, unless he was already strong enough to fight him before the win as well as after.
Latium is reduced to a state in which peace and war seem alike intolerable. They make war when they should have made terms, and terms when they should have made war, so that the friendship and the enmity of Rome are alike fatal. Manlius Torquatus breaks them. Camillus subdues them, garrisons their towns, takes hostages, and reports that the whole of Latium lies at the senate's mercy. Government, Machiavelli says, is so controlling subjects that it is neither in their power nor in their interest to harm you. Camillus puts the choice: blot out the Latin nation, or admit the vanquished to citizenship. The strongest government is the one they rejoice in who obey it. The senate takes each city separately: exemptions and citizenship for some, razed towns and colonies for others. No half-measures. Florence in 1502, when Arezzo and the Val di Chiana revolt, outlaws some, condemns some, strips all of dignity, and leaves the town standing. Honour, they say, forbids dismantling it, as if a republic that cannot hold a town should keep it for appearance. By that rule no parricide would be put to death. True honour is knowing how to chastise so the offender cannot offend again. Privernum's spokesman, asked what punishment his people deserve, answers: such as they deserve who deem themselves worthy of freedom. Asked what peace would follow a pardon, he says a firm peace if granted on fair terms, a brief one if unfair. The wiser senators hear the voice of freedom and manhood, and admit Privernum to Roman citizenship. Men whose only thought is for freedom are worthy to be Romans. The Samnites at the Caudine Forks will not listen to the old man who says send the Romans away with honour or put them all to death. They take the middle course, disarm them, pass them under the yoke, and let them go disgraced and angered. The warning comes true.
Wise men of Machiavelli's day quote a Florentine saying that Pisa must be held by fortresses. Rome, while free, never built a fortress to hold a city, though she sometimes let those stand that she found. Fortresses against foreign foes are unnecessary if you have an army. Fortresses against subjects are mischievous. They come from hatred, hatred from ill conduct, ill conduct from thinking you can rule by force, and that thought from the fortress on their backs. They make a ruler bolder in outrage. In war they are attacked by foes both foreign and domestic. A petty fortress cannot stand artillery. Two methods keep a people under: a strong army in the field, as Rome had, or scattering them so they cannot combine. Strip wealth and arms still remain. Take weapons and rage will supply them. Kill chiefs and heads renew like the Hydra. Francesco Sforza builds a fortress in Milan and his heirs, trusting it, behave as they like until they become odious and lose the state. In war it is no defence. Guido Ubaldo of Urbino, restored after Cesare Borgia drove him out, dismantles his forts: beloved subjects need none, and against foreigners only an army in the field would hold them. Julius loses Bologna's citadel after his governor oppresses the people. Niccolò da Castello, returning from exile, pulls down two forts Sixtus IV had built. In 1507 Louis XII recovers Genoa and builds a citadel on Codefa stronger than any before known, commanding harbour and town. In 1512 the Genoese rebel again. Ottaviano Fregoso reduces the citadel by famine over sixteen months, then pulls it down. Formerly a thousand foot could change the government. Afterwards ten thousand cannot harm him. Costly for the king to build, shameful to lose. Glorious for Ottaviano to take, useful to destroy. Florence's Pisan fortresses are delivered to Charles VIII, by treachery or fear. A city that has lived free and can cloak revolt in the name of liberty must be made a companion or destroyed, as Rome did. Tarentum and Brescia are not proofs to the contrary. Fabius is sent with an army that could have retaken Tarentum without a citadel, and Capua is retaken with none. The French commander reaches Brescia in three days with a great army already at Bologna. A Spartan, asked what he thinks of the walls of Athens, says they are fine walls if meant to hold women only. Francesco Maria della Rovere marches on Urbino and leaves ten hostile cities behind him. The prince without a strong army should strengthen the city he dwells in, keep supplies, and keep the inhabitants well affected. All other expedients are costly in peace and useless in war. Rome sought security against Latium and Privernum in bolder courses, never thinking of fortresses.