A multitude is strong while it holds together and weak as soon as each person thinks of a private danger. After the Gauls, many Romans go to live in Veii against the senate. The edict names a day and a penalty. At first they deride it. When the day comes, all obey. Livy writes that although bold enough collectively, each separately, fearing punishment, makes his submission. A people will be open-mouthed against a prince's decree, then, when they have to look punishment in the face, and put no trust in one another, hasten to comply. A headless mob is terrible in its first onset and feeble once each man thinks of his own house. Unless they appoint a head at once, as they did with twenty tribunes after Virginia, the multitude that held together becomes weak and contemptible. The two exceptions are liberty taken, and a loved prince who still lives.
Machiavelli then takes up the charge every historian repeats: nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude. They condemn Manlius Capitolinus and later lament him. He will not give princes an exemption. An uncontrolled prince commits the same faults as an uncontrolled crowd. Kings bound by law, as in France, in Egypt of old, or in Sparta, are the wrong comparison. Match a people chained by the laws with a prince chained by the laws, and the people show more virtue. Rome, while uncorrupted, never serves abjectly nor domineers haughtily. Through magistrates they keep their place. They put forth strength against Manlius and the decemvirs, and obey the dictator when the public welfare requires it. If Manlius rose from the dead they would condemn him again. Alexander mourns Clitus. Herod mourns Mariamne. That is a prince's inconstancy, not a people's. For four hundred years the Roman people hate the regal name and keep the glory of the country. They are less ungrateful than princes. In the choice of magistrates they will not confer dignity on the infamous; a prince may readily be drawn to do so. Cities in the hands of the people grow faster: Rome after the kings, Athens after Pisistratus. Princes surpass peoples in first legislation. Peoples surpass them in keeping what has been established. A prince who can do as he pleases is a madman. A people which can do as it pleases is never wise. A turbulent people can be spoken to by a good man and brought back. A wicked prince is cured only by the sword. With a people we fear what may come. With a wicked prince we dread what is.
Leagues follow the same passions, with one delay. Engagements made under duress are kept by neither. Demetrius, named the City-taker, is refused shelter in Athens, a city under obligation to him. Pompey is killed by Ptolemy, whom he had restored. Commonwealths are slower to resolve, and so slower to break faith. Saguntum awaits ruin with Rome. Florence in 1512 stands by the French. A slight advantage will make a prince break faith. A very great advantage has failed to move a commonwealth. Neapolitan princes who had linked their fortunes to France keep faith because they despair of finding friendship from her enemies. Themistocles offers Athens a chance to seize or destroy the allied Greek navy. Aristides reports it extremely advantageous and extremely dishonourable. The people refuse. Philip of Macedon would not have refused.
Once the consulship is open to the commons, Rome gives it without respect to age or blood. You cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold out rewards, and you cannot, without danger, withhold the rewards you have promised. Valerius Corvinus is consul at twenty-four, and tells his soldiers the office is the reward not of birth but of desert. A city that wants Roman results cannot wait until excellence has grown old and lost the alacrity it needed. Whether that empire was more due to valour or to fortune has not yet been asked.