If cities born in freedom still struggle to frame laws that keep them free, cities that began in subjection will find this almost impossible. Rome is given ordinances by Romulus, Numa, Tullus, Servius, and the Ten, and new needs still appear. The censors become arbiters of morals and retard corruption, but their first term is five years. The dictator Mamercus shortens it to eighteen months. The censors then in office strip him of his senate rank. Commons and fathers blame the step. History records no redress. Either Livy omitted something, or the laws of Rome were defective: a commonwealth should not let a citizen suffer irremediable wrong for a measure favourable to freedom. Florence, long under Rome and then under other rulers, spends two hundred years patching old bad rules into new ones. Public votes keep commissioning a few men to reform, and they write only for their party. Life and death in Rome sit with appeal to the people, or, in extremity, a dictator. Florence first gives that power to a foreign captain open to corruption, then to eight citizens who will be governed by the few most powerful: a change from bad to worse. Venice stacks Ten, Forty, and the Pregai so a powerful offender can still find a tribunal, unless an accuser is wanting.
No council or magistrate should be able to bring the city to a stay. T. Q. Cincinnatus and Cn. Julius Mento, consuls at variance, stop all business. The senate wants a dictator. The consuls agree only in resisting that. The tribunes force them to yield. If you grant a council the distribution of honours, or a magistrate a branch of business, you must oblige performance, or ordain that on failure another may and shall do it. Venice learns the same when the great council, from ill-humour or bad advice, will not name successors, and city and provinces sit without lawful governors. Wiser citizens pass a law that no magistracy is vacant until it is filled.
What you must do should look like a gift. The senate grants pay from the public purse to soldiers who had served at their own charges, because long wars and sieges require it. The city is intoxicated with delight. The tribunes warn that taxes will follow. They cannot persuade the people to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude. The heavier taxes fall first on the nobles, and those which have to be paid first.
The safest check on a citizen growing too strong is to forestall him in the paths by which he advances. Had the senate kept to methods like the soldier's pay, they would have deprived the tribunes of credit, and in a corrupted commonwealth this is the easier and less objectionable way. Banishing Cosimo was worse than taking his methods for gaining the people: those who opposed him could have succeeded without violence or tumult by taking his most effective weapon from his hands. Opposing Piero Soderini so that his fall ruined the republic was worse than stealing his popular weapons. His influence came from skill in securing the affections of the people and a name for loving the liberties of the commonwealth. Soderini could not honourably take the Medicean path his enemies used against him, because he had been put forward to defend that liberty, and favours to that party could not have been rendered secretly and once for all. Tullius, trying to diminish Marcus Antonius, invests Octavianus and sends him against Antonius with the consuls and Caesar's veterans, affirming that the soldiers will rally to Caesar's nephew. Antonius persuades the heir to throw over Tullius and the senate. The reverse of what was promised happens, and the senate is ruined. Remembering the captain who seized sovereign power, they should never have believed that Caesar's name, or soldiers who had followed Caesar, would serve freedom.