Two Types of Virtue — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith grounds virtue in two reciprocal efforts already described: the spectator's attempt to enter another's sentiments, and the agent's attempt to moderate passion to a pitch others can share. From the first come the amiable virtues of tenderness, indulgence, and humanity; from the second the respectable virtues of self-command, dignity, and governed anger. Soft sympathy that re-echoes friends' fortunes is lovable, while clamorous grief or unchecked rage disgusts us, and restrained sorrow or measured resentment commands reverence. To love our neighbor as ourselves, he notes, pairs with loving ourselves only as our neighbor can love us.

True virtue, however, is not ordinary propriety but uncommon excellence. Humanity demands more sensibility than the vulgar possess; magnanimity demands more self-command than most can exert. Eating when hungry is proper but not virtuous, while falling short of perfect propriety in extreme trials may still deserve praise because the effort approaches perfection more closely than circumstances allow.

We therefore judge actions by two standards: an ideal of complete propriety no conduct reaches, and the common level actually attained in human life. The same double measure applies in art criticism when we compare a work with perfection and with its rivals. Smith closes by noting that decency in expressing passion depends on how far mankind generally sympathize with that passion, which sets different proper pitches for grief, resentment, love, and bodily appetite.