Much of human happiness and misery flows from how we view our past conduct, and that view always refers to what we imagine ought to be others' sentiments. We examine ourselves as an impartial spectator would. A man raised in solitude could no more judge his character than his face without a mirror; society supplies that mirror in others' countenances. We first judge others, then learn they judge us; we divide the self into agent and judge, as judge and panel cannot coincide. Virtue is amiable and meritorious because it excites love and reward in others, not in itself. Man is accountable first to fellow-creatures, then to God; Providence veils eternal sanctions lest human business cease, yet appoints man vicegerent judge on earth.
When the world's verdict conflicts with natural principles, we appeal to the tribunal within the breast. Yet that tribunal's authority derives from society: unable to please everyone, we imagine a candid spectator with no private tie to us. The weak live by the inferior court of fashion; the man of reflection courts the "man within." This arbiter alone corrects the optical illusion by which our little finger outweighs the destruction of China in passive feeling, though no one would sacrifice millions to save it. Reason, principle, and conscience, not feeble humanity, enforce the propriety of justice and self-sacrifice. Melancholy moralists who would damp all joy with unseen misery, and Stoics such as Epictetus who bid us view our griefs as we view a neighbor's, both miss the mark; yet habit teaches us to view our fortunes as others view them.
Self-judgment is weakest when most needed. Passion discolors prospective scrutiny, as Malebranche said passions justify themselves while they last; afterward we extenuate rather than condemn, sometimes rekindling old resentments to avoid seeing our injustice. This self-deceit, source of half life's disorders, would force reformation if we saw ourselves as others would with full knowledge. Nature's remedy is general rules formed from observing what shocks or delights mankind in particular cases. We do not first approve actions by rule; rules crystallize repeated experience of immediate detestation, as at the first sight of perfidious murder. Once fixed, rules check fury and self-love, as the man of violent resentment trembles before a sacred maxim even while he violates it.
Coming Up in Chapter 27
Having established how our inner moral judge develops, Smith next explores why these general moral rules carry such powerful authority over us, and how they connect to our deepest beliefs about divine justice and cosmic order..