When Kindness Can't Be Forced — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith contrasts justice with beneficence to explain why one may be compelled and the other cannot. Beneficent actions from proper motives alone invite reward because only they excite sympathetic gratitude; hurtful actions from improper motives alone deserve punishment because only they excite sympathetic resentment. Beneficence is free: its absence disappoints hope but inflicts no positive evil and provokes disapprobation, not resentment men will share. Ingratitude is hateful yet unpunishable, and forcing gratitude would dishonor the benefactor.

Resentment, given for defense, guards innocence and prompts retaliation to secure repentance and example; spectators refuse to follow it beyond that office. Justice differs: violation injures particular persons from disapproved motives, warrants resentment and punishment, and may properly be enforced even before civil government, as neighbors rally to stop robbery but only counsel the uncharitable father.

Superiors may command some beneficent duties by law, yet among equals force for kindness would be insolence. Excess beneficence earns highest gratitude; mere justice is often a negative virtue that only refrains from harm, deserving little positive reward though breach demands retaliation. The unjust should feel the evil they imposed; the merely innocent merits only that others observe the same restraint toward him.