The captains of Machiavelli's day have discarded the method that lets an army take a first shock and still stand: three ranks, not a new gun, and foot rather than hired horse. The most momentous battle Rome fought with another nation is the Latin day under Torquatus and Decius. As by the loss of that battle the Latins become subject, so by winning it they might have reversed the yoke. The two sides match in language, discipline, arms, numbers, and obstinacy. Livy says the only difference is that the Romans have the more capable commanders. Something extra still has to happen, or neither army will turn its back. Torquatus slays his son. Decius dies by his own hand. Stubbornness lasts longer in the Roman ranks. Livy then lays out the three divisions those later captains have discarded. Hastati stand close in front. Principes wait behind in open file, ready to receive the first if it is driven in. Triarii wait still more open. If the last rank must fight, the army is in jeopardy. The proverb is playing a last stake. Fortune must declare three times against a commander who can renew his strength thrice. Christendom's armies have only the first onset. Their line is either a thin front of great width, or columns with no gap for the broken first to fall into. The front jostles the second. The second cannot advance. A trifling accident ruins the field. At Ravenna both French and Spanish advance side by side. At S. Regolo, Florentine horse posted in front fall back on their own foot. Ciriaco del Borgo tells Machiavelli he has never been routed by any cavalry save those fighting on his side. The Swiss, serving with the French, put themselves on the flank so friendly horse cannot disorder them.
The excuse is artillery. Machiavelli will not grant it. The common opinion is that had guns been in use, the Romans could not have spread as they did, that personal valour can no longer be shown, that the old tactics cannot be followed, and that in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery. He answers that war is offence or defence, and that guns hurt the defender more than the attacker. A small town whose walls are battered in a few days is undone unless there is room to fall back behind new works. Where men can advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery cannot check them. Northern nations storm in mass and one man pushes the next through the breach. Italian skirmishers, scaramouches, advance in knots and die. At Brescia, M. de Foix makes no account of the Venetian guns ranged along the road from citadel to town, dismounts with his men-at-arms, walks through the batteries on foot, and takes the town. In a great city the defender cannot mount guns of the same size, and if he places them low they are useless. The walls are battered down and almost buried in their ditches, so that close fighting is worse than before. An entrenched camp is no safer. The Spaniards at Ravenna, posted between the river Ronco and an earthwork carried too low, are forced out by French fire. Even a complete high camp is then wasted, its friends stormed, and its supplies cut, until it must come out and fight. Rome made wars of attack. Guns would have made her conquests easier. Individual valour is riskier now when men scale a wall one by one, and captains can be reached everywhere, yet in twenty-four years of Italian war few commanders die by shot. The French commander at Ravenna dies by steel. If men no longer do deeds of prowess, the cause is faulty discipline, not the gun. The Swiss at Novara in 1513, with neither guns nor horse, rout a French army behind artillery. Employed by an army with some strain of ancient valour, artillery is useful. Employed otherwise, against a brave adversary, it is useless. The only advantage a captain without that valour has had from it is the terror into which horses unused to such sounds are thrown by the roar of the guns.
Rome trusts foot more than horse. At the lake Regillus the horsemen dismount to steady wavering ranks. Hannibal at Cannae scoffs that they might as well have been delivered in chains. Machiavelli will follow a commonwealth and her many captains over one soldier, however excellent. A man on foot can go where a horse cannot. Infantry can recover form. Horses cannot. A spirited horse with a faint-hearted rider, or the reverse, breeds disorder. Condottieri, having no lands and no constant pay for many foot, keep two or three hundred horse in high credit and let infantry dwindle to a sprinkling. That, with other ill practices, leaves Italy open to the North. At Sora the leaders on both sides fall at the first onset. The Romans dismount, force the enemy to do the like, and win. Crassus is outwitted in Parthia, not closed with. Antonius, cut off from supplies, is still not dared by the Parthian horse. Nine thousand Swiss foot at Novara beat ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry. Twenty-six thousand Swiss later march on Milan against Francis I, who has twenty thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred guns; they are not victorious as at Novara, yet they fight two days and bring off half their number. Carmagnola first charges the Swiss on horseback and loses men. He then dismounts his men-at-arms, places them in front of his foot, and cuts the Swiss down. Princes of the present day will not revive that militia.