A war you can start is not a war you can end, and a chest, a famous name, and a rule to attack or wait are not strength until you know whether you have soldiers of your own. Any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his pleasure bring it to a close. A prince must measure his strength before he engages, and must not deceive himself. He will always deceive himself if he measures that strength by money, by advantage of position, or by the goodwill of his subjects, while he has no army of his own. Those things may swell strength. They do not constitute it. Without an army they are null. Lakes and mountains without valiant defenders become a level plain. Money is more likely to leave you a prey. Quintus Curtius, watching a Spartan king forced to fight Antipater for want of pay, declared money the sinews of war. Princes less wise than they should be still cite the maxim and lay up treasures. Were treasures enough, Darius would have beaten Alexander, the Greeks the Romans, Charles of Burgundy the Swiss, and the pope and Florentines Francesco Maria in the war of Urbino. After showing Solon his treasure-house, Croesus is told that war is made with iron and not with gold, and that another coming with more iron might carry the gold off. A tribe of Gauls, shown Macedonian gold as a warning, break off peace to take it. The Venetians, with a full treasury, lose their dominions without deriving the least advantage from their wealth. Gold will not gain you good soldiers. Good soldiers may readily get you gold. Had the Romans made war with gold rather than iron, the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed. Making war with iron, they never felt any want of gold, because those who feared them brought it into camp. Want of money may force a battle, as want of food or a coming reinforcement may. That is no ground for calling gold the sinew. Livy, asking whether Alexander could have vanquished the Romans in Italy, names many and good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune. He does not mention money. The Campanians, asked by the Sidicinians to arm, measured strength by wealth, suffered two defeats, and became tributary to Rome.
Livy could not have put the next mistake more aptly: the Campanians rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any substantial aid. Alliances with princes who dwell too far, or who from their own embarrassments cannot help, afford reputation rather than protection. Florence in 1479, attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples, drew from the French king more reputation than help. The Emperor Maximilian is named as the same kind of friendship. Men take on the defence of others when they have neither skill nor ability to defend themselves. The Tarentines send word that they desire peace between Rome and Samnium, and will make war on whichever begins hostilities. The consul laughs, orders the signal, and advances.
When invasion is imminent, men well versed in arms still split. Some say go into the enemy's country. Croesus tells Cyrus to meet Tomyris inside her own dominions so a defeat can be followed up. Hannibal tells Antiochus the Romans cannot be vanquished except in Italy, where an invader can use their friends, and that Rome can be taken more easily than the empire. Agathocles, unequal at home, invades Carthage and reduces her to sue for peace. Scipio shifts the war from Italy into Africa. Others say await the attack. The Athenians keep their superiority while they fight at home and lose their freedom when they go to Sicily. The poets have Antaeus strong only on his own earth. Ferrando of Naples, dying, tells Alfonso never to pass his frontier. Alfonso sends an army into Romagna, loses it, and loses his dominions without a battle. The invader shows higher courage and dries the springs of money. The defender intercepts supplies, uses knowledge of the country, and musters men more willingly to save their homes. Leave your country and you risk your entire fortunes without putting forth your whole strength. Machiavelli will not pick one door for every house. If the country is undefended, as Carthage was and as France and Italy are, keep the enemy at a distance, because strength lies in money and invasion cuts the supply. Carthage can wage war in Italy while Africa is free, and cannot defend herself against Agathocles once she is invaded. The Florentines cannot stand Castruccio at home and later strip the Duke of Milan in his own country. If the country is armed, as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the closer you press it the harder it is to subdue. Hannibal's three defeats, suffered in Gaul in the same space of time, would have made an end of Rome, because the remnants could not have been turned to account as they were in Italy. Rome never sends more than fifty thousand to invade a province. Against the Gauls at home she brings some eighteen hundred thousand. The Cimbrians rout a Roman army in Germany, where there is no means to repair the disaster, and are destroyed in Italy. The Swiss may be beaten abroad with thirty or forty thousand. At home they can assemble a hundred thousand and are well-nigh invincible. The prince whose people are armed and trained should always await a great and dangerous war at home. He whose subjects are unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should carry the war as far from home as he can.